Voting Machine Analysed, Found Wanting

From the linked site:

The authors have done a security analysis of Diebold code that was downloaded from an open FTP site earlier this year. While the paper is technical, significant portions of it can be read easily by a non-computer scientist.

From the conclusion of the paper, "Analysis of an Electronic Voting System", emphasis mine:

Using publicly available source code, we performed an analysis of a voting machine. This code was apparently developed by a company that sells to states and other municipalities that use them in real elections. We found significant security flaws: voters can trivially cast multiple ballots with no built-in traceability, administrative functions can be performed by regular voters, and the threats posed by insiders such as poll workers, software developers, and even janitors, is even greater. Based on our analysis of the development environment, including change logs and comments, we believe that an appropriate level of programming discipline for a project such as this was not maintained. In fact, there appears to have been little quality control in the process....

The model where individual vendors write proprietary code to run our elections appears to be unreliable, and if we do not change the process of designing our voting systems, we will have no confidence that our election results will reflect the will of the electorate....